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German Churches in Times of Demographic Change and 
Declining Affiliation: A Projection to 2060
David Gutmann, Fabian Peters
Abstract: The problem of declining membership in Germany’s churches has been 
apparent for almost half a century. However, few scientific studies have investigated 
the respective influences of demographic and church-specific phenomena, as well 
as the potential impact if present trends continue. To answer these questions, we 
use a cohort component model and project the membership of each German Catho-
lic diocese and Protestant regional church until 2060. Thus, for the first time we 
present a projection of church members for each of the 27 Catholic (arch-) dioceses 
and the 20 Protestant regional churches, as well as for the entire Evangelical Church 
and the Roman Catholic Church in Germany. We collected data from dioceses, Prot-
estant regional churches and the Federal Statistical Office. Under the assumptions 
made, the results suggest a continued decline in membership and that by 2060 the 
number of church members would be half the number of 2017. Protestant Church 
membership would have shrunk slightly more than Catholic Church membership. 
We can conclude that church-specific factors (baptisms, leaving, and joining the 
church) would have a stronger influence on declining numbers than demographic 
factors. Moreover, demographic change would have a greater impact on registered 
church membership than on the total population. The proportion of Christians in the 
population would sharply decrease. Although in 2017 54.4 percent of the population 
belonged to one of the two major churches, according to the projection model, only 
31.1 percent would be church members in 2060. As our results are not predictions 
but projections using trend analysis, we show how changed conditions would affect 
the projected development in five scenarios.
Keywords: Church membership · Demographic change · Multi-region cohort-
component model · Multi-state population projection · Christianity · 
Roman Catholicism · Protestantism
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1 Introduction
Since the early 1970s, Protestant regional churches and Roman Catholic dioceses in 
Germany have continuously lost members. At the same time, the share of the popu-
lation that is not a member of either church is increasing. From 1995 to 2017, it has 
risen from 32.0 to 45.6 percent (Sekretariat der Deutschen Bischofskonferenz 2018, 
Table 7.24, own calculation). The number of church members fell during the same 
period by a total of 10.79 million, from 55.64 to 44.85 million.1 The development 
of church membership not only influences the churches’ organisation of pastoral 
care and services, but also the development of church revenue, in particular the 
church tax. It also raises the question of the long-term financial viability of church 
personnel and real estate. Moreover, the question of how the number of Catholics 
and Protestants in Germany will develop in the long term is not only a concern 
to the churches. In addition to their ecclesiastical duties, churches have taken on 
numerous social tasks instead of the state, in accordance with the so called sub-
sidiarity principle provided for in the German Basic Law (constitution). They operate 
kindergartens, adult education institutions, hospitals and care facilities. Including 
their charities Caritas and Diakonie, the churches are among the largest employers 
in Germany. If the proportion of the population who are members of one of the two 
churches continuously decreases, the institutional relationship between society as 
a whole and the churches will have to be redefined in the long term. 
Against this background, we present a projection of the number of members 
for the Evangelical Church2 and Roman Catholic Church in Germany, and for the 
first time, for each of the 27 Catholic (arch-) dioceses and the 20 Protestant region-
al churches. Assuming present trends continue, we analyse the impact of demo-
graphic as well as church-specific factors, such as baptisms, leaving, and joining the 
church on future membership development. In the past 10-15 years, membership 
figures either for all of Germany or for individual Protestant regional churches or 
Catholic dioceses were occasionally analysed, projected and published (for exam-
ple, see Hackett et al. 2015; Benz/Raffelhüschen 2013; Benz et al. 2011 or Eicken/
Schmitz-Veltin 2010). Thus far, however, there has been no overview of nationwide 
developments, which take into account regional and denominational characteris-
tics, as well as the development of the total population. To ensure comparability 
with the state population projection, we mainly considered the assumptions con-
cerning the demographic development from the federal government’s 13th coordi-
nated population projection (Statistisches Bundesamt 2015). 
We structure this article as follows: In Section 2, we describe the institutional 
background and the recent development in church membership in Germany, and 
place them in the European context. Specifically, we address the demographic as 
1 This article refers exclusively to the members of the 20 Protestant regional churches and 27 
Catholic dioceses in Germany. 
2 The association of the 20 German Lutheran, Reformed and United regional churches (Landes-
kirchen) forms the Evangelical Church in Germany (Evangelische Kirche in Deutschland; EKD).
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well as church-specific determinants on which the number of church members de-
pends, and derive from their previous development the hypotheses that we want 
to test. In Section 3, we present the methodology for the projection model. We 
describe our cohort component model and explain the data used, as well as the un-
derlying assumptions. In Section 4, we present the results. In Section 5, to illustrate 
the impact of individual determinants on the overall development, we examine five 
scenarios with changed assumptions. In Section 6, we discuss the hypotheses, and 
conclude the article.
2 Church membership in Germany
2.1 Religious affiliation and religiosity
In 2017, slightly more than half of the German population was a member of either 
the Catholic or Protestant Church. The two denominations are almost the same 
size: 23.31 million Germans are Catholic; 21.54 million are Protestant. About 2.40 
million Germans were members of other Christian denominations (Kirchenamt der 
EKD 2018a: 4). Beyond Christianity, the second-most widespread faith is Islam, with 
an estimated 4.7 million followers in 2017.3 
Registered church membership is brought about by baptism. Although in Ger-
many baptisms predominantly take place during childhood, they can take place at 
any age. Moreover, not all parents who are church members baptize their children. 
Furthermore, church members may leave the church of their own volition. People 
also have the option of switching their registered church membership to another 
denomination, or to rejoin after deregistration.4 In Germany, rules on membership 
are within the constitutionally protected autonomy of the churches. Therefore, in-
ternal church law regulates joining and leaving the church, as well as exclusion from 
the church. Deregistration from church membership does not affect baptism as an 
ecclesiastical act. This is why people who rejoin the church are not baptized again 
(Petersen 2017: 91-92). A baptized individual is registered in the records of the local 
parish, and this parish informs the state-run registration office about the individual’s 
membership. Because state laws give churches the status of public corporations, 
they enjoy some privileges, such as establishing religious education at state schools 
or offering diaconal services in the public welfare system. A particular feature of 
being a public corporation is the right to levy church taxes on members, which is 
an income tax surcharge regulated by the state income tax law.5 Therefore, pay-
ing church tax is compulsory for every church member in Germany with a taxable 
3 The number of Muslims in Germany is not recorded statistically. Estimates vary from 4.4 to 4.7 
million people. See Halm and Sauer (2017: 16) and Hackett et al. (2015: 237, own calculation). 
4 In the following, we use the term joining the church for both types of registration.
5 Depending on the federal state in Germany, the tax rate amounts to 8 percent or 9 percent of 
the income tax (Petersen 2017: 157-161). The state authority collects the church tax revenue and 
forwards this money to the Christian churches (Petersen 2017: 11-14).
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income. If an individual resigns from church membership, the state tax authority 
stops levying the church tax.
The proportion of Catholics and Protestants in the total population varies widely 
by region for historical reasons (Sekretariat der Deutschen Bischofskonferenz 2018, 
Table 1.11). In 2017, three out of four church members of a Catholic diocese or a 
Protestant regional church lived in western or southern Germany.6 Because of the 
anti-church communist regime in the former German Democratic Republic, only 
7.2 percent of all church members live in eastern Germany. Overall, the members 
of Protestant regional churches are distributed more evenly throughout Germany. 
In contrast, 88.7 percent of Catholics live in southern or western Germany. With a 
lower proportion of Christians in the total population, the share of people leaving 
the church from all churches tends to be higher, and the baptism rate (i.e., the ratio 
of baptisms of children to births) is lower than in regions with a high Christian share 
in the total population. 
The church register shows that the number of Catholic diocese and Protestant re-
gional church members in Germany dropped steadily from 1995 to 2017, from 55.64 
to 44.85 million. This decrease corresponds to an overall decrease of 19.4 percent, 
or 0.9 percent per year since 1995. The share of registered Catholics or Protestants 
in the total German population decreased from 68.0 percent in 1995 to 54.4 percent 
in 2017. 
In Europe, the absolute Christian population increased from 1910 to 2010. How-
ever, the proportion of the total population fell from 94.5 to 76.2 percent (Hackett et 
al. 2011: 15). Pollack and Rosta (2015: 93) used the European Values Study to investi-
gate the development of religious affiliation in various Western European countries. 
The authors show that religious affiliation declined between 1981 and 2008. Burkim-
sher (2014: 442-443) examined the available data on trends in religious attendance 
across 24 European countries, with different methods for assessing current trends. 
She concluded that depending on the method, the indicators “often do not fully 
agree on whether there is growth, decline, or stability.” For some years, there has 
been disagreement among scientists about the continuous decline in religiousness. 
The increase in the number of members actively leaving the church, the decrease in 
(predominantly Catholic) priestly ordinations and the loss of social relevance have 
been interpreted as clear signs of secularisation (Pollack/Rosta 2015: 89). Beyond 
advocates of the secularisation theory, some scholars do not foresee a continuous 
decline in the future, but rather a revival of religion (Pollack/Rosta 2015: 89-97). 
The Pew Research Center has calculated that the number of Christians in Eu-
rope7 would decline from 553.28 million in 2010 to 454.09 million in 2050 (Hackett 
et al. 2015: 147), and for Germany from 56.55 million in 2010 to 41.64 million in 2050 
6 We give a tabular overview of the regional assignment of (arch-)dioceses, Protestant regional 
churches and federal states in the appendix.
7 The Pew Research Center’s list of European states includes 50 countries and territories. These 
are countries that, according to the definition of the United Nations, belong to the geographical 
region “Europe” and for which the United Nations Population Division provides general popula-
tion estimates.
German Churches in Times of Demographic Change and Declining Affiliation    • 7
(Hackett et al. 2015: 237, own calculation). According to their calculations, the pro-
portion of Christians in the European population will fall from 74.5 to 65.2 percent, 
and the Christian share of the German population from 68.7 to 59.3 percent (Hackett 
et al. 2015: 147, 237).
For the present study it is important to distinguish between registered church 
membership and religiosity. Based on the 2005 Generations and Gender Survey, 
Hackett et al. (2011: 80, own calculation) estimated that there were approximate-
ly 56.55 million Catholics and Protestants8 in 2010. This number corresponds to 
a share of 68.7 percent of the German population. That same year, 48.55 million 
people were officially registered as members of the two major churches, so that 
the registered share made up 59.4 percent of the total German population. The dif-
ference between the survey-based estimate and the church registers of 8.00 mil-
lion people reveals the empirical weakness of survey data. This is why we use the 
churches’ register data for our projection and focus on the registered membership 
of the Roman Catholic dioceses and Protestant regional churches in Germany, not 
on religious trends in society. This difference becomes clear when looking at church 
attendance: The proportion of service attendees in all registered church members 
is 4.7 percent for the Protestant churches (Kirchenamt der EKD 2018a: 8, 15, own 
calculation) and 9.8 percent for the Catholic dioceses (Sekretariat der Deutschen 
Bischofskonferenz 2018: table 7.3).
2.2 Determinants 
In 2017, the two major Christian churches in Germany lost 660,000 registered mem-
bers. The decline was based on demographic factors (births,9 deaths, and the mi-
gration of church members) and church-specific factors (baptisms, leaving, and 
joining the church). 
2.2.1 Fertility and mortality
Fertility and mortality are important variables in the calculation of future population 
figures. Similarly to other Western European societies, Germany is experiencing a 
double ageing process: low birth rates since the 1970s and a steadily increasing life 
expectancy (Fetzer 2005: 3). 
The current total fertility rate – measured per calendar year – in Germany has 
risen since 1995, from about 1.4 to about 1.6 children per woman. The relationship 
between religion and childbearing varies across European countries, as Peri-Rotem 
(2016) analysed for Britain, France and the Netherlands: “These findings suggest 
that fertility differences by religion also depend on the particular social context of 
religious institutions in each country.” Frejka and Westoff (2008) showed differences 
8 According to the 2005 Generations and Gender Survey, there are another 1.14 million Orthodox 
Christians and more than 550,000 other Christians in Germany (Hackett et al. 2011: 80). 
9 I.e. children born by a Protestant or Catholic mother.
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in fertility between Christians and non-Christians according to the European Values 
Study results. In general, they show that religiosity is associated with higher fertility, 
with religiousness measured by the frequency of church attendance and the impor-
tance of religion in daily life (Frejka/Westoff 2008: 27-28). The authors found higher 
fertility for Christian (especially Protestant) women than for women with no reli-
gion, as well as for those with an Orthodox affiliation (Frejka/Westoff 2008: 22). Our 
findings based on the German state income tax statistics (Statistisches Bundesamt 
2018d), however, show virtually no difference among Protestants, Catholics and 
people who are not registered church members. The income tax statistics are a cen-
sus, and contain information on the taxable income of 52.68 million inhabitants of 
Germany, who are referred to as tax cases (Statistisches Bundesamt 2018e). Thus, 
these statistics include almost the entire population aged 20-65 years. As Table 1 
shows, the average number of children of non-denominational tax cases is higher 
than that of denominated tax cases. This evaluation shows that registered church 
membership does not necessarily allow statements about religiousness. The higher 
value of tax-admissible children for non-denominational tax cases can probably be 
explained by deregistrations of Catholic and Protestant parents predominantly aged 
25 to 35 and thus an older age structure of the churches compared to the total 
population. For our projection model, we therefore assume no fertility differences 
between church members and the total population.
Concerning mortality, several studies do not support differences between mem-
bers of the two major churches and the total population in Europe. Lerch et al. (2010: 
235) show for Switzerland that members of the Catholic and Protestant churches 
have an intermediate level of mortality. Non-members of a Christian church have 
the lowest life expectancy. In contrast, life expectancy among members of other 
Christian churches is highest (Lerch et al. 2010: 235). Goujon et al. (2017: 56) also 
do not assume any differences in mortality between church members and non-
members for their study on church membership in Austria until 2046. They justify 
their approach with unavailable data. In the case of Germany, there is also no data 
available.
Tab. 1:  Average number of tax-admissible children per tax case, 2014
Number of Tax cases Tax cases Number of Average number 
tax-admissible with admissible without tax cases of tax-admissible
children children admissible children
children
Protestants 4,798,539 2,934,018 8,166,401 11,100,419 0.43
Catholics 5,326,062 3,222,269 8,784,843 12,007,112 0.44
Others 7,958,377 5,003,949 12,064,516 17,068,465 0.47
Total 18,082,977 11,160,235 29,015,760 40,175,995 0.45
Source: own calculation based on Statistisches Bundesamt (2018d).
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2.2.2 Migration
In a special evaluation for the two major churches, the Federal Statistical Office cal-
culated confessional migration flows from the local-level migration statistics to the 
church organisational structures (Statistisches Bundesamt 2018c). We distinguish 
between internal and external migration. Internal migration refers to migration of 
Catholics (and Protestants) within Germany from one diocese (and Protestant re-
gional church) to another. External migration refers to migration beyond the bor-
ders of Germany. For Germany as a whole, internal inflows equal internal outflows. 
Depending on the Catholic diocese or Protestant regional church, internal migration 
flows can lead to either gains or losses in membership. For Catholic dioceses and 
Protestant regional churches with a lower denominational share than others, inter-
nal migration flows lead to a positive migration balance because immigrants are 
more likely to belong to the corresponding denominations than emigrants. Figure 1 
shows the differences between the Protestant and Catholic churches with respect 
to their external migration balance.10 
10 The difference between Protestant or Catholic church members who move to Germany and 
those who move away from Germany, and officially register their church membership. To what 
extent non-Germans who are not aware of a church tax liability from their country of origin state 
their confession upon entry is not the subject of this study. For Christian internal migration, it 
cannot be ruled out that, at least in the past, before joining the state-automated reporting sys-
tem (OSCI XMeld), religious registration was not, or was not stated correctly, in the framework 
of relocations within Germany.
Fig. 1:  Balance of Catholic and Protestant external immigration and emigration, 
1991-2015
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The high external migration numbers for Protestant Christians before the turn of 
the millennium was due to the migration of German descendants from countries of 
the former Eastern Bloc (so-called Russia Germans). These migratory movements 
are now completed, and should not play a role in the long-term projection (Eicken/
Schmitz-Veltin 2010: 582). Migration from southern and eastern Europe has strongly 
influenced Catholic external migration flows since 2011. These migrants are mainly 
from the predominantly Catholic countries of Italy, Croatia, Poland, and Spain. How-
ever, as demographic trends in these European countries are similar to those in 
Germany, the potential for people of migrant age will also decline in the coming 
decades (Statistisches Bundesamt 2015: 38). 
Strong refugee migration in 2014 and 2015, and changes in the survey method in 
2016, limit the comparability of the database in these years. For this reason, we con-
sider the period between 2000 and 2013 without the year 2008, which was affected 
by a statistical adjustment. In this period, the external migration surplus of Ger-
many amounted to 2.22 million people. Of these individuals, 0.13 million (5.9 per-
cent) were members of the Protestant Church, and 0.51 million (23.0 percent) of the 
Catholic Church. 
2.2.3 Baptisms
As baptism establishes church membership, baptism behaviour is crucial to the 
development of registered membership. In the early 1990s, almost 300,000 Catholic 
and 300,000 Protestant baptisms took place in Germany each year; in 2017, there 
were only 170,000 Catholic and 176,000 Protestant baptisms. However, the absolute 
number of baptisms is not very meaningful. A more meaningful indicator is the ratio 
of the number of Catholic (Protestant) baptisms of children and the total number of 
children a Catholic (Protestant) mother gives birth to in one year.11 If this indicator 
is 100 percent, the development of baptisms of children corresponds to that of the 
live births by Catholic or Protestant mothers. If the indicator is lower, subsequent 
age cohorts of Catholics (Protestants) are smaller than they would be simply due to 
the demographic trend. If it is higher, subsequent age cohorts are larger than the 
number of children female church members give birth to in one year. This indicator 
varies regionally between the 27 Catholic (arch-)dioceses and 20 Protestant regional 
churches, between 40 percent and 106 percent.12 Although these regional baptism 
rates vary widely, they have been constant since the beginning of the 2010s in the 
respective Catholic dioceses and Protestant regional churches (Verband der Diöz-
esen Deutschlands 2018; Kirchenamt der EKD 2018b; own calculation). 
11 According to German law, children up to the age of 14 are not allowed to choose their own 
membership in a church. This is why we understand baptisms up to the age of 14 as baptisms 
of children. 
12 We compare all children a Protestant or Catholic mother gives birth to with all baptisms of 
children up to the age of 14 which take place in the same year. Thus, the numerator and the 
denominator do not relate to the same time, but form a good benchmark. 
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Compared to the baptisms of children, baptisms of adults have less influence. 
In 2017, 85.9 percent of all baptisms took place during the first six years of life. The 
two denominations show differences in baptism behaviour. Although 93.8 percent 
of all Catholics are younger than six when they are baptized, only 78.2 percent of all 
Protestants are baptized before the age of six. Another 14.7 percent of Protestant 
baptisms take place in the 10 years thereafter until the 16th birthday – 9.7 percent be-
tween the ages of 12 and 15, around the age of confirmation. In the Catholic Church, 
we observe a slight increase in baptisms at the age of communion, around the ninth 
year of life. In total, 4.5 percent of all Catholic baptisms take place between the ages 
of 7 and 15. However, Catholic confirmation, which takes place at about the same 
age as Protestant confirmation, does not lead to an increase in baptisms (Verband 
der Diözesen Deutschlands 2018; Kirchenamt der EKD 2018b; own calculation). 
2.2.4 Joining and leaving the church
In addition to baptisms, the balance of people who join or leave the church also 
influences membership development. In both denominations and in all German re-
gions, more people leave the church than join. Annually, about 30,000 people join 
the Protestant Church and 10,000 people join the Catholic Church. In both denomi-
nations, the number of people joining the church has hardly changed over time. In 
contrast, Figure 2 shows that the number of members leaving the church deviates 
from year to year. However, it follows similar trends in both churches, and in all re-
gions of Germany at different levels. The number of members leaving the church is 
higher in the Protestant Church than in the Catholic Church. 
The balance of people joining and leaving the church is crucial for the devel-
opment of registered membership. If we also take baptisms of adults into consid-
eration, the results of the two denominations are more similar. The almost 20,000 
Protestant baptisms of adults clearly outweigh the approximately 3,000 Catholic 
baptisms of adults, so that the balance of people leaving the church and those join-
ing the church, including baptisms of adults, is about the same.
The ratio of members leaving the church and church members fell steadily from 
the early 1990s (Protestant: 1.3 percent, Catholic: 0.7 percent) until 2005 (0.5 per-
cent, 0.4 percent), but has been rising again since then, peaking in 2014 (1.2 percent, 
0.9 percent; Sekretariat der Deutschen Bischofskonferenz 2018, tables 7.24 and 
7.25). Since 2014, the ratio has remained relatively high. Particular events strongly 
influenced the development: the introduction of the solidarity surcharge in 1991, 
debates regarding the history of sexual abuse in the Catholic Church in 2010,13 the 
public controversy around the generous lifestyle of the Bishop of Limburg in 2013, 
and the introduction of the amended deduction of the church tax on capital gains in 
2014. In addition, there are regional disparities. The church-leaving ratio is particu-
larly high in large cities, such as Berlin, Hamburg and Munich, but the ratio is lower 
13 The sexual abuse scandal in 2010 only led to an increase in Catholics, but not of Protestants, 
leaving the church.
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in regions with a high proportion of registered church members among the total 
population.
If we calculate the age- and gender-specific number of members leaving the 
church in relation to the respective cohort strength, we observe differences in de-
registration behaviour. For the whole of Germany, Figure 3 shows an above-average 
likelihood during the working life between the ages of 20 and 60. The highest likeli-
hood of leaving the church is approximately between the 25th and 35th year of life. 
In all Catholic dioceses and Protestant regional churches, more men than women 
leave the church (Riegel et al. 2019: 182). 
2.2.5 Summary: Effects of determinants
If we consider the influence of the individual determinants coherently, we can in-
tuitively explain the proportion of Catholic and Protestant church members in the 
total population by age. In 2017, 54.4 percent of the overall German population was 
a member of one of the two major churches. However, Figure 4 shows that church 
affiliation varies greatly between the different age cohorts. The increasing church 
affiliation up to the age of 15 is based on a biographical effect. The denominational 
Fig. 2:  Development of people joining and leaving the church, 1991-2017
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shares grow due to baptisms in childhood and adolescence. As most baptisms take 
place not by birth, but during infancy, we see a particularly strong increase to about 
40 percent during the first three years of life. By the age of 15, additional baptisms 
lead to a slower increase to approximately 60 percent of the total population. Up 
to the age of 25, the proportion of church members stagnates. In the following 15 
age cohorts, the level decreases to about 50 percent of the total population. This 
change is mainly due to deregistration. Especially in the case of Protestant regional 
churches, the decline would be even stronger if joining and baptisms of adults did 
not counteract the decline. From the age of 40, the share of people registered as 
members of one of the two churches continuously rises again. At the age of about 
70 years, the proportion reaches the level of 15-25-year-olds. More than two-thirds 
of the people older than 70 in 2017 were members of one of the two major churches, 
and three quarters of those older than 80. The high proportion of church members 
in the older population is because these age cohorts were almost all baptized as 
infants, and only very few left the church.
2.3 Hypotheses
We examine whether and how the decline in membership will evolve in the long 
term and how it would affect the overall population if present trends continue. If 
Fig. 3: Age- and gender-specific ratio of leaving the church in 2017
Ratio of members leaving the church
0.000
0.005
0.010
0.015
0.020
0.025
0.030
0.035
0-
4
5-
9
10
-1
4
15
-1
9
20
-2
4
25
-2
9
30
-3
4
35
-3
9
40
-4
4
45
-4
9
50
-5
4
55
-5
9
60
-6
4
65
-6
9
70
-7
4
75
-7
9
80
+
Age groups
Average ratio of members leaving the churchMen Women
Source: own calculation based on Kirchenamt der EKD (2018b); Verband der Diözesen 
Deutschlands (2018).
•    David Gutmann, Fabian Peters14
we follow the argument of the churches, the decline in membership is mainly due 
to the general population development, that is, demographic changes. Thus, in a 
2018 press release, the EKD calculated that more people joined the church than 
actively left. It compared the number of people who were baptized or joined the 
church with the number of people leaving the church (i.e. deregistering). However, 
the high number of Protestant deaths is responsible for the overall membership 
decline (Kirchenamt der EKD 2018c). This argument establishes connections be-
tween different factors which we must disentangle. In addition to natural effects of 
demographic changes (i.e., the difference among deaths, births, and the migration 
balance) at the individual decision-making level, church-specific factors, such as 
baptisms and people joining and leaving the church, play a role. Registered church 
membership does not begin at birth, but at baptism. Consequently, church-specific 
factors compound the decline due to demographic changes. This is why we test 
hypothesis 1:
Hypothesis 1: If the trend of recent years continues, the Protestant and Catho-
lic churches in Germany will continuously lose members by 2060 in both absolute 
terms and relative to the total population of Germany.
If we distinguish between demographic and church-specific decreases in mem-
bership, the following picture emerges in absolute numbers for 2017: 651,000 deaths 
of Protestant or Catholic church members, compared to 415,000 children given birth 
to by a Protestant or Catholic mother (Verband der Diözesen Deutschlands 2018; 
Fig. 4: Proportion of registered church members in the population by age in 
2017
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Deutschlands (2018); Statistisches Bundesamt (2015, 2018b/c).
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Kirchenamt der EKD 2018b; own calculation). We add to this number the external 
migration of church members, who made up a positive balance of 28,000. Thus, 
due to demographic factors, the decline in membership was 208,000 in 2017. This 
decrease represented 0.5 percent of all church members. Concerning the total pop-
ulation, there were 785,000 births and 933,000 deaths (Statistisches Bundesamt 
2018a). We additionally observe a positive external migration balance of 415,000. 
This leads to a population increase of 267,000 people, or 0.3 percent of the total 
population. While the churches are facing a demographic loss, the overall popula-
tion has a demographic surplus. The contrary development is mainly because only 
a fraction of migrants registers as members of one of the two Christian churches. 
From this finding, we derive hypothesis 2:
Hypothesis 2: Even if we only take into account the development of demographic 
factors in recent years, the decline in membership of Christian churches will be 
greater than the decline in the total population.
Concerning the decline in church membership, we must also pay attention to 
church-specific influences. For illustrative purposes, we use the data for 2017: 
365,000 members leaving the church are up against 36,000 people joining and 
21,000 baptisms of adults. In addition, despite 414,000 confessional births, only 
324,000 baptisms of children took place. Due to church-specific influences, the 
Protestant and Catholic churches in Germany lost 398,000 members (0.9 percent). 
Church-specific factors had nearly twice as much impact in 2017 as demographic 
factors, which leads us to hypothesis 3:
Hypothesis 3: If the trend of recent years continues, church-specific factors will 
have a greater impact on membership development than demographic factors.
Finally, for the varying intensity of church-specific factors, the distribution of 
church members throughout Germany in particular depends on internal migration 
flows of church members. We observed the highest losses because of internal mi-
gration in Catholic dioceses and Protestant regional churches with a high share 
of the population belonging to the corresponding denomination. Moreover, we 
can show that Catholic dioceses and Protestant regional churches which benefit 
from high internal migration (such as the dioceses of Hamburg and Berlin) have the 
highest losses due to church-specific influences. Thus, the Catholic dioceses and 
Protestant regional churches benefit only to a limited extent. From this finding, we 
derive hypothesis 4:
Hypothesis 4: If the trend of recent years continues, regional disparities in the 
distribution of Protestants and Catholics in Germany will weaken by 2060.
3 Data and method
We project the membership of each Protestant regional church and Roman Catholic 
diocese in Germany, as well as the remaining total population, from the base year 
2017 until 2060. In line with the multi-state population projection by the Federal Sta-
tistical Office of Germany, our projection is based on the cohort-component method 
with deterministic assumptions (Statistisches Bundesamt 2015: 27). This is the most 
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widely-used method, based on the work of Cannan (1895), Bowley (1924) and Whelp-
ton (1928) (George et al. 2004: 571). Leslie (1945) developed the component method 
in matrix notation as it is used today. The cohort-component method, along with 
trend extrapolation and structural models, are among the objective population pro-
jection methods that are to be distinguished from subjective methods. These objec-
tive methods, which are also used together, make a selection necessary, for exam-
ple with regard to the data source, projection method, and assumptions (George et 
al. 2004: 562). Rogers (1967, 1975) further developed the cohort-component model 
into a multi-regional model. Rees and Wilson (1977) complemented this system and 
introduced a model that describes population stocks and flows based on accounts, 
thereby using the benefits of accounting principles. Based on this work, we use a 
multi-region cohort-component model. In addition to the demographic factors, we 
supplement the church-specific factors. Due to the large number of subpopulations 
– 27 Catholic dioceses and 20 Protestant regional churches – that are in interaction 
with each other, we develop a multi-church cohort component model with inter-
region rates and regional immigration and emigration flows.
3.1 Data
We use data from the Federal Statistical Office, as well as from the Protestant re-
gional churches and Roman Catholic dioceses. We calculate the total population of 
Germany in the base year 2017 with help of the population update from the federal 
government (Statistisches Bundesamt 2019). We use assumptions on fertility, exter-
nal migration balance and further life expectancy from the 13th coordinated federal 
population projection. We choose a middle-case scenario of the variants containing 
fertility and external migration balance, and assume a combined permanent total 
fertility rate of 1.5 and a total external migration balance of 150,000 (Statistisches 
Bundesamt 2015). We assume a linear increase in life expectancy for men from 78.3 
to 84.8 years from 2017 to 2060, and for women from 84.6 to 88.8 years.14 Accord-
ing to the findings described in Section 2.2.1, we assume no differences in fertility 
and life expectancy between members and non-members of the two churches.
Church-specific data on the age- and gender-specific distribution of members 
who were baptized, joined, and left the church in the dioceses and Protestant re-
gional churches come from the registries of the 20 Protestant regional churches and 
27 Catholic dioceses. The technical procedures and data collection of these regis-
tries are very different. Therefore, the nationwide coordinated data collection was 
associated with complex data processing. Nearly all of the 47 dioceses and regional 
churches provided an age- and gender-specific distribution of their members and 
of the people who left, joined, and were baptized in the years 2013-2017. Therefore, 
the present data are unique in scope and level of detail.
14 Further life expectancy at birth corresponds to variant L1 of the multistate population projection 
by the German Federal Statistical Office.
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3.2 Projection model
The starting point is the gender- and age-specific structure of the total population pt in the base year t :
The exponent f (m) describes the female (male) population. pt,α represents the 
number of people in period t who are α years old. The maximum age to reach is 100, 
so that the row vector pt contains 202 entries. We divide the total population pt at 
time t into the sum of the members of the 28 Roman Catholic dioceses rci,t, the 20 
Protestant regional churches pci,t and the remaining population rpt.15 The remaining 
population represents the share of the total population of Germany who belongs to 
neither of the two major churches:
The membership of the Catholic Church in Germany is the sum of the members 
in the 28 Catholic dioceses . The nationwide Protestant membership cor-
responds to the sum of the members of the 20 regional Protestant churches 
We project each subpopulation until the year 2060. The procedure is the same for 
the Catholic dioceses and the Protestant regional churches. For calculating the 
membership of a diocese rci in the following year, we correct for baptisms (brci,t), 
mortality, people joining the church (erci,t), members leaving the church (drrci,t) and 
migration (mrci,t) during the year so that: 
brci,t, erci,t, drrci,t and mrci,t are row vectors, structured correspondingly to pt. LMt is 
the valid Leslie Matrix in t that contains the age- and gender-specific fertility ratios 
(fr) and survival probabilities (sp).16 The 202x202-matrix is structured as follows:
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15 Concerning the Catholic Church in Germany, we consider the official district of Oldenburg, 
which actually belongs to the diocese Münster, separately along with addition to the 27 (arch-)
dioceses. This is why we handle 28 Catholic subpopulations.
16 The technical procedure we follow is based on Bonin (2001: 245-249).
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Let sp�i,t,α be the probability that a woman belonging to diocese i and aged α years 
in period t survives until the beginning of period t + 1. �r�t,α is the number of girls 
a woman aged α years gives birth to during period t and who survive until the be-
ginning of period t + 1. Accordingly, is the survival probability for men and 
�rmt,α is the fertility rate for boys. As we set all fertility rates to zero, no zero-year 
church members initially live in period t + 1. By multiplying by the Leslie matrix, 
we automatically correct rci,t+1 for deaths. For survival probabilities, we use fed-
eral state-specific values (Statistisches Bundesamt 2018b).17 If a Protestant regional 
church or a diocese is located in several states, we weigh the survival probability 
according to the respective proportion of members in the federal states. 
The course of the Catholic diocese- and Protestant regional church-specific 
likelihood of leaving the church is very similar nationwide, albeit as described in 
Section 2.2.4 at a different level. For the projection, we assume that the Catholic 
diocese- and Protestant regional church-specific likelihood of leaving the church 
remains constant at the increased level of 2013-2017 in the long term. To calculate 
deregistrations, we use the arithmetic mean of the deregistration rates of 2013-2017. 
We weigh these deregistrations with the age- and gender-specific distribution of 
deregistrations in 2017, so that:
drrci,s is the total number of members leaving the church in diocese i in year t, i.e. rci,t is the total number of members of diocese i in year t. We calculate the number 
of people joining the church accordingly.
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For the calculation of baptisms, we distinguish between those of children up to 
the age of six and those of people older than seven. For baptisms up to the age of 
six, we use the number of births (crci,t+1), calculated with age-specific fertility:
Let �r� be a column vector with 101 entries, which contains the age-specific fer-
tility rates for girls ,  where is greater than zero only for women of child-
bearing age between 15 and 49 years. We construct �rm accordingly for male live 
births. Let rc�i,t be a row vector containing, according to the structure of rci,t, only 
the first 101 entries (and thus, only the female share) of the membership structure.
We calculate baptisms of 0 to 6 year olds as gender- and age-specific shares in 
the total fertility rates within a diocese. As in the case of people joining and leaving 
the church, we use a five-year average of baptisms. Because there are no actual 
figures for births, we provisionally use only the calculated births of the base year to 
determine the proportion of baptized births, so that:
For male baptisms, we proceed accordingly. The ratio of baptisms of children to 
the total number of children a Catholic (or Protestant) mother gives birth to seems 
to be relatively stable over the course of time (see Section 2.2.3). Therefore we as-
sume that the ratio is permanently constant. To determine the number of baptisms 
after the age of seven, we calculate them according to the procedure for people 
joining and leaving the church. 
We divide the total migration into internal and external migration, so that:
For internal migration of Catholics (and Protestants), we use the migration flows 
of 2013 between the 28 Catholic dioceses (and 20 Protestant regional churches). 
These flows were measured in a special evaluation of the Federal Statistical Office 
for the two major churches. This evaluation provides the migration flows of Catho-
lics (and Protestants) between Catholic dioceses (and Protestant regional churches). 
The internal migration of a diocese corresponds to the difference between immigra-
tion from other dioceses and emigration to other dioceses, so that
 
 
��������� =���* ������ ,
��������� =���* ������ .
 
6
7 
 
ሺ݂ݎ௧ǡ௔௙ ሻ 
 
 
݂ݎ௧ǡ௔௙  
 
 
������� � ��∑
���� �������
∑ ���������
���������� � ����� .
q�� �����
 
8
 
 
࢓࢘ࢉ࢏ǡ࢚ ൌ ࢓࢘ࢉ࢏ǡ࢚࢏࢔࢚ ൅ ࢓࢘ࢉ࢏ǡ࢚ࢋ࢚࢞ . 9
 
 
��������� � �∑ � ������
��� 	
∑ ��������������
� ���������� ������ ∑ � ������
��� 	
∑ ��������������
� ��������������� � � 	����. 10
•    David Gutmann, Fabian Peters20
represents the absolute number of migrations from diocese j to diocese i in 
2013. We construct mint as a row vector according to pt. It represents the age- and 
gender-specific distribution of the internal migration flows.
To determine external migration, we adopt a multi-year average from 2000-2013 
without 2008, which was affected by a statistical adjustment. For the calculation of 
immigration into the Protestant church, we assume the arithmetic mean permanent-
ly. As described in Section 2.2.2, the potential of Catholic migrants will decline over 
the coming decades, so that for Catholic immigration, we expect a linear decrease 
of 65 percent of the baseline between 2025 and 2040. We divide the absolute fig-
ures according to the age and gender of external migration to the Federal Republic 
of Germany in 2015. 
To project the remainder of the total population, we first multiply rpt by the valid 
Leslie Matrix for the entire German population in t, and then adjust for church-spe-
cific factors such as baptisms and people joining and leaving the church. Thus, the 
remaining population results in the following year as:
mrp,t describes external migration, which we adjust for denominational migra-
tion flows, so that:
4 Projection results 
4.1 Membership development
If the trend of recent years continues in the future, by 2060, the number of church 
members in Germany will be almost half that of today. Figure 5 shows how the 
number of Protestants, Catholics and the remaining population might develop in 
the long term. From 1995 to the mid-2020s, the number of the total population, with 
slight fluctuations, remains relatively stable at around 82 million. Until 2060, we 
observe a continuous decline to 72.95 million. The picture is different for registered 
church members. Although they numbered 55.64 million in 1995, by 2017, they re-
duced by 10.79 million (to 44.85 million). Until 2060, the number would continue to 
decrease to 22.65 million. Thus, the absolute number of church members in 2060 
would be about 50.5 percent of the 2017 count. For the Catholic Church, this would 
mean a decrease from 23.30 million church members in 2017 to 12.15 million in 2060 
(a decrease of 11.15 million). In the same period, the number of Protestants would 
fall from 21.53 million to 10.50 million (a decrease of 11.03 million). 
The decline in the absolute number of registered church members is reflected 
in the proportion of Protestants and Catholics in the total population. Due to demo-
graphic changes, the number of the total population would also decrease, but much 
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less dramatically. Due to church-specific factors such as baptism, deregistration, 
and joining the church, the share of registered church members in the total popu-
lation would continue to decline steadily. In 2060, only 31.1 percent of the popula-
tion would be registered as Protestant or Catholic. In 1960, however, the propor-
tion of registered church members in the total West German population was about 
93.7 percent (Sekretariat der Deutschen Bischofskonferenz 2018, Table 7.24, own 
calculation). 2024 marks a turning point in terms of church membership in Germany: 
From then on, it is no longer a majority of the people living in Germany registered 
with either of the two major churches. By 2030, the annual relative losses would 
amount to about 1.4 percent of the total members. Thereafter, the relative loss 
would grow to 1.8 percent annually by 2060.
Looking at the decline of church members in the year 2060, we observe only 
minor differences between the two denominations. Compared to 2017, the Catholic 
Church would lose 47.8 percent by 2060, a slightly lower share than the Protestant 
Church, with 51.2 percent. The slower decline is due to the greater Catholic immi-
gration from abroad. When external migrations are not taken into account, the dif-
ference in membership decline between the Catholic Church (-51.2 percent) and the 
Fig. 5: Projected development of total population and church members in 
Germany, between 1995-2060
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Protestant Church (-52.9 percent) decreases. The different age structure is another 
distinguishing feature.
As the average age of church members increases, there are less members of 
younger age cohorts. Because young people between the ages of 25 and 35 have 
a higher likelihood of leaving the church, the annual proportion of people leaving 
the church in all registered members would subsequently fall from 0.8 percent to 
0.7 percent during the projection period. The rate of people joining the church would 
remain almost constant until 2060. A larger decline can be observed in baptisms. 
While 42.3 percent of all children born in Germany in 2017 were baptized, this rate 
would be only 22.5 percent in 2060. The absolute number of baptisms would de-
crease by almost 60.3 percent. Due to the greater life expectancy and the lower ten-
dency to leave the church, the proportion of women among church members would 
increase slightly, from 53.8 percent to 54.4 percent, during the projection period.
4.2 Age structure 
In 2017, church members were older than the total population. Moreover, the more 
recent birth cohorts are also relatively small. With reference to the total population, 
we find that fewer church members are under the age of 20 (15.9 vs. 18.3 percent of 
the total population), there are fewer church members between the ages of 20 and 
64 (58.2 vs. 60.2 percent) and more are older than 65 years (25.9 vs. 21.5 percent). 
This distribution varies greatly between the individual Catholic dioceses and Prot-
estant regional churches. 
Figure 6 shows the projected changes in age structure of church members in 
Germany up until 2060. In the base year 2017, the largest age cohorts are the baby 
boomers between the ages of 45 and 65 years old. These age cohorts will shift up 
in the coming years. Three bulges of the membership structure stand out: baby 
boomers age 45 to 65, their parents age 75 to 85 and their children age 20 to 35. 
At the beginning of the projection period, these children are in their reproductive 
ages. This explains the currently increased number of births in Germany (the baby 
boomers’ grandchildren). Between 2025 and 2035, baby boomers will reach retire-
ment age. Then there is the strongest shift between the working population aged 20 
to 64 and the age group over 64. The age structure for the year 2040 illustrates the 
long-term nature and persistence of population-dynamic processes (Statistisches 
Bundesamt 2015: 5). Not only the children, but also the grandchildren of the baby 
boomers are visible. 
Another 20 years later, in 2060, the children of today’s baby boomers will be 
around 70 years old. Due to the assumed baptism and deregistration behaviour 
(Fig. 6), we can no longer detect the grandchildren of the baby boomers who would 
be about 40 years of age in 2060; in the state population of 2060, we can clearly 
observe these cohorts. 
To reveal the expected age process, we divide the age distribution in Figure 6 into 
three age groups. In 2017, 25.9 percent of church members were over the age of 64; 
this share was higher among the Protestant Church (28.0 percent) than among the 
Catholic Church (24.1 percent). At the end of the projection period, 40.4 percent of 
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registered church members would be older than 64 years. The difference between 
the denominations would continually decrease. In 2060, 41.1 percent of Catholics 
and 39.5 percent of Protestants would be older than 64 years. Consequently, the 
Catholic Church would lose relatively more members after 2060. 
We estimate a similar, but less pronounced, increase in the total population for 
the over-64 age group, from 21.5 percent in 2017 to 32.5 percent in 2060. The num-
ber of working age people in Germany between the ages of 20 and 64 would fall 
by 25.7 percent, from 49.67 million in 2017 to 36.86 million in 2060. The number of 
church members of working age would fall from 26.08 million to 10.66 million dur-
ing the same period (-59.1 percent). These changes in membership structure would 
influence the churches’ pastoral services. The changes would also have an impact 
on church tax revenue, and from the perspective of the churches as employers, on 
the labour supply.
Fig. 6: Projected age structure of Protestants and Catholics in Germany, 2017, 
2040, and 2060
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4.3 Regional distribution
In 2017, more than three-quarters of Catholics and Protestants in Germany lived in 
a Catholic diocese or Protestant regional church in western or southern Germany. 
This general distribution within Germany would also persist over the projection pe-
riod. All four regions will lose church members. Losses would be somewhat lower 
in southern Germany and strongest in eastern Germany. According to our calcula-
tions, in the year 2060 only 1.49 million Christians would live in eastern Germany 
(see Table 2). Based on the state population in this region of Germany, this number 
would correspond to a Christian share of about 12.4 percent in the total popula-
tion.18 
The starting point and the development is different for the two denominations. 
In 2017, the members of the Protestant Church in Germany are spread evenly with 
the exception of eastern Germany. In contrast, only 2.63 million of the 23.30 mil-
lion Catholics belong to a diocese in northern or eastern Germany, respectively. 
The remaining 20.66 million Catholic church members live in western or southern 
Germany. Because of this unequal distribution, the losses would be lower in the 
18 As we do not project the total population in the federal states but only in the whole of Germany, 
we refer to variant 2 of the state population projection for regional analysis of the total popula-
tion in 2060. See Statistisches Bundesamt (2015). 
Tab. 2: Projected regional distribution of church members in Germany, 2017 
and 2060
North East West South Total
2017 2060 2017 2060 2017 2060 2017 2060 2017 2060
Church members
in millions 7.59 3.71 3.21 1.49 17.30 8.45 16.73 9.00 44.83 22.65
in relation to 2017 (in percent) 48.9 46.4 48.9 53.8 50.5
in percent of the total
population 51.5 29.1 22.3 12.4 67.0 36.9 62.4 35.4 54.3 31.0
Protestant 
in millions 5.77 2.66 2.40 1.01 7.30 3.58 6.06 3.25 21.53 10.50
in relation to 2017 (in percent) 46.1 42.1 49.1 53.6 48.8
in percent of the total
population 39.1 20.8 16.7 8.4 28.3 15.6 22.6 12.8 26.1 14.4
Catholic 
in millions 1.82 1.05 0.81 0.48 10.00 4.87 10.66 5.75 23.30 12.15
in relation to 2017 (in percent) 57.6 59.1 48.7 54.0 52.2
in percent of the total
population 12.4 8.2 5.7 4.0 38.7 21.2 39.8 22.6 28.2 16.7
Source: own calculation based on Kirchenamt der EKD (2018b); Verband der Diözesen 
Deutschlands (2018); Statistisches Bundesamt (2015, 2018b/c).
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regions with fewer Catholics in northern and eastern Germany than in southern and 
western Germany. This would be mainly due to internal migration. Anyone moving 
from southern or western Germany to northern Germany (Hamburg in particular) or 
eastern Germany (Berlin in particular) would be more likely to be Catholic than those 
who move in the opposite direction. In relative terms, Protestant regional churches 
would lose most members in eastern Germany. This is due to the age structure. 
In 2017, 35.2 percent of all Protestants living in eastern Germany were 65 years or 
older. The corresponding value for all Protestants in Germany is 28.0 percent. At the 
end of the projection period, this difference would be balanced (40.4 percent and 
39.5 percent). 
5 Scenarios
The results show a trend of how membership could develop in the coming years, 
but are not a one-to-one prediction (Pötzsch 2016: 38). We assume that the trend of 
recent years is also representative of the future. If the value of individual influential 
factors changes in the long term, the results will differ from the actual development. 
Therefore, in this section, we show how changes in the framework conditions affect 
the projection results. We show an overview of the scenarios “no external migra-
tion”, “only demography”, “higher fertility”, “secularisation” and “evangelisation” in 
Figure 7 and Table 3.
5.1 No External Migration
The projection is based on annual external migration to the two major churches 
of about 50,000 people, which would decrease to 24,000 between 2025 and 2040. 
Due to immigration from the predominantly Catholic countries of Croatia, Italy, and 
Poland, the Catholic Church, with an external migration balance of 40,000 persons 
in 2017, would benefit considerably more than the Protestant Church. In contrast 
to fertility and mortality, migration is subject to strong fluctuations. Therefore, de-
riving a trend for the future is difficult (Statistisches Bundesamt 2015: 37-41). This 
2017 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 2055 2060
Baseline 44.85 43.08 40.23 37.46 34.79 32.20 29.69 27.23 24.85 22.65
No External Migration 44.85 42.93 39.84 36.86 34.02 31.31 28.68 26.11 23.64 21.34
Higher Fertility 44.85 43.08 40.25 37.52 34.91 32.38 29.93 27.54 25.24 23.13
Only Demography 44.85 44.32 43.48 42.57 41.55 40.37 39.09 37.80 36.57 35.42
Secularisation 44.85 43.02 39.93 36.76 33.59 30.44 27.34 24.29 21.36 18.65
Evangelisation 44.85 43.11 40.42 37.91 35.58 33.38 31.30 29.31 27.42 25.72
Tab. 3: Scenarios for projected church memberships, 2017-2060
Source: own calculation based on Kirchenamt der EKD (2018b); Verband der Diözesen 
Deutschlands (2018); Statistisches Bundesamt (2015, 2018b/c).
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is why we calculate a scenario without external migration. If we ignore external 
migration flows, both churches will lose another 1.31 million members by 2060. 
The number of registered church members would be 21.34 million, 11.27 million of 
which would be Catholic (-0.89 million) and 10.08 million Protestant (-0.42 million).19
5.2 Higher Fertility
Although relevant studies have suggested a higher fertility of religious people com-
pared to non-religious people (Peri-Rotem 2016; Frejka/Westoff 2008: 23), we were 
able to show that the fertility of registered church members is not higher than that 
of non-members. If we continue to assume that people who are no longer religious 
leave the two churches (Riegel et al. 2018: 187-189), this could lead to a steadily 
increasing proportion of religious people among the remaining church members. 
Accordingly, the total fertility rate of church members could rise in the coming dec-
19 Deviations result from rounding.
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ades, and in the long run, equal the observed level of religious people. Therefore, 
we examine how a continuously increasing total fertility rate would affect member-
ship development. Moreover, it is likely that the likelihood of leaving the church 
would decrease if religion among church members is higher. However, to isolate 
the impact, we only consider a higher fertility in this scenario. We expect a linear 
increase in the combined total fertility rate, from 1.5 in 2017 to 1.7 in 2060. That 
would mean 0.48 million more church members (+2.1 percent) than calculated in 
the baseline scenario. Consequently, an increase in fertility would have only a small 
impact on declining membership.
5.3 Only Demography
To examine how strong demographic changes affect the membership of both 
churches, we assume a scenario with no people actively joining or leaving the 
church. Moreover, we assume that every child a Protestant or Catholic mother gives 
birth to is baptized at birth. Consequently, this scenario includes only demographic 
factors, that is, the number of children a Protestant or Catholic mother gives birth 
to, the deaths of registered church members and the external migration balance of 
Protestants and Catholics. 
Demographic changes alone lead to a decrease in membership from 44.85 mil-
lion to 35.42 million (21.0 percent). Consequently, declining registered membership 
would be only about one third due to demographic change. Two-thirds would be 
due to church-specific factors. If we also take these into account, i.e. baptism and 
people leaving and joining the church, the membership of both churches would 
be 22.65 million in 2060. The difference in the demography-related development 
of 12.77 million church members is due to 5.31 million fewer baptisms of children, 
a negative balance of 8.87 million people joining and leaving the church and 1.41 
million deaths of church members who have left the church since the base year.20 
Of the total membership decline, 28.5 percentage points are attributable to church-
specific factors.
Therefore, church-specific factors would influence the overall decline more 
strongly than demographic factors. Especially in the first years of the projection, 
the children of the baby boomers would be between 20 and 35 years old, when 
the likelihood of leaving the church is highest. Therefore, deregistration would be 
particularly high, and fewer births and baptisms would take place. In the 15 years 
between 2025 and 2040, the births by Protestant and Catholic mothers would fall by 
33.7 percent. Because the deaths of church members would also fall by 14.6 percent 
during the same period, the impact of demographic factors would steadily increase. 
These opposing trends would intersect around the year 2040. Subsequently, the an-
nual demographic decline would be stronger than the church-related decline. The 
churches can only address the issue of declining membership through influencing 
baptism behaviour, as well as the tendencies to join or leave the church. 
20 Church members who left the church since 2017 and died by 2060.
•    David Gutmann, Fabian Peters28
5.4 Secularisation and evangelisation
Nevertheless, many pertinent studies suggested that the likelihood of leaving the 
church may continue to increase, and the trend toward secularisation of society will 
continue (Pollack/Rosta 2015: 223; Voas/Doebler 2011: 59-60; Voas/Crockett 2005: 
24; Ebertz 2005: 42; Norris/Inglehart 2004: 24-27). In a secularisation scenario, 
therefore, we gradually double the age- and gender-specific likelihood of leaving the 
church until 2060. At the same time, we suggest a continuously decreasing age- and 
gender-specific likelihood of being baptized as an adult and joining the church to 
50 percent of the value in 2017. With these assumptions, 4.00 million fewer people 
would be registered church members in 2060. Compared to the baseline scenario, 
this corresponds to a further decrease of 8.9 percent. During the projection period, 
about 0.48 million fewer people would be baptized as adults or join the church, and 
3.39 million more people would leave the church. 
In contrast to the secularisation theory, fewer scientists postulate a revival of 
religion (Riesebrodt 2000; Graf 2004). We consider this thesis unlikely, but theoreti-
cally possible. Therefore, we analyse the reverse case in an evangelisation scenario: 
a gradually decreasing age- and gender-specific likelihood of leaving the church 
until 2060 by 50 percent, and at the same time, a continuously doubling age- and 
gender-specific likelihood of being baptized as an adult and joining the church until 
2060. In this scenario, 3.07 million more people would be registered as Catholic or 
Protestant, and thus, 6.9 percent more than the baseline scenario. About 2.00 mil-
lion fewer people would leave the churches, and 0.97 million more people would be 
baptized as an adult or join the church.
For the two denominations, the effects are different. In the secularisation sce-
nario, 54.3 percent of the total decrease of 4.00 million Christians would be attribut-
able to the Protestant Church, and 45.7 percent to the Catholic Church. However, 
the Protestant Church would also gain significantly more members in the evangeli-
sation scenario: 61.1 percent of the 3.07 million members in this scenario would be 
Protestant, and 38.9 percent Catholic. The fact that the Protestant Church is more 
affected by these two scenarios is linked to the higher number of people joining 
and leaving the church, which are church-specific factors. There is more movement 
between the members of the Protestant Church and non-members.
6 Conclusion
With the present projection of members for the Protestant and Catholic churches 
in Germany, we have shown that by the year 2060 both churches would lose al-
most half of their registered members if present trends continue. Protestant Church 
membership would shrink slightly more than Catholic Church membership, which 
is essentially due to less external migration and an older age structure. The propor-
tion of church members in the total population would decrease nationwide from 
54.4 percent in 2017 to 31.1 percent in 2060. Thus, Hypothesis 1 is supported. 
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The reasons for decline include demographic and church-specific influences. 
Demographic changes would more severely affect the two churches than the total 
population. Although the number of inhabitants in Germany is projected to decrease 
by 11.6 percent by 2060, the decline due to demographic factors in the churches 
would be 21.0 percent of the 2017 membership. This deviant development has two 
reasons. The total population is more likely to benefit from external migration. Al-
though the confessional migration balance would continue to be around 0.1 percent 
of all members, the share of total population would increase from 0.3 to 0.6 percent. 
In addition, the relative decline due to the excess of deaths over births in the two 
churches would be, on average, more than twice as large as that of the total popula-
tion. Thus, Hypothesis 2 is also supported. 
The question of whether church-specific influences would play a greater role than 
demographic influences results in a more differentiated picture. Overall, church-
specific factors would have a greater impact on the decline in membership than 
demographic ones. Although there would be 9.42 million fewer church members 
(-21.0 percent) by 2060 for demographic reasons alone, the drop due to church-spe-
cific factors would total an additional 12.77 million (-28.5 percent). In particular, the 
development of the number of people leaving the church has been very volatile over 
time. Therefore, it is conceivable that the parameterisation of the baseline scenario 
would not be achieved in the long term. We were able to show in a secularisation 
scenario and in an evangelisation scenario that continuously changing behaviour in 
leaving and joining the church can lead to significant changes in membership devel-
opment. There is a difference of 7.07 million registered church members in the year 
2060 between the scenarios we chose. If there are any promising approaches for 
churches to slow down membership decline, then they should look at these three 
factors.21 Looking at the influence of both categories (demographic and church-
specific influences) over time, we remark that the impact of church-specific factors 
is decreasing. From the mid-2040s onwards, demographic factors would have a 
greater impact on membership decline. Therefore, Hypothesis 3 is only partially 
supported. 
An ambiguous picture also emerges in the case of Hypothesis 4. Higher dereg-
istration and lower baptism rates in regions with a lower proportion of Christians in 
the total population would exacerbate regional disparities. However, internal migra-
tion would counteract these church-specific effects, as the denominational internal 
migration flows to diaspora regions tend to be stronger than in regions with a high 
proportion of Christians.
Of course, such a long-term projection based on what-if assumptions is not a 
precise prediction (Pötzsch 2016: 38). Nonetheless, it provides new, deep insights 
into the structure and development of church membership in Germany. From the 
present projection results, the two churches could derive processes for dealing with 
the cost-intensive areas of staff and infrastructure. In addition, this project clarifies 
21 To what extent strategic decisions made by the church management can actually influence 
church-specific factors is not the subject of this study.
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the relevance of church-specific factors, and identifies the influence of baptism, 
joining and leaving behaviour as ultimately the only strategic starting points for 
longer-term planning by the churches. Due to the many subsidiary maintained facili-
ties, decisions by church management have consequences for the state. These de-
cisions will affect citizens and decision-makers at the federal, state and local levels.
Finally, demographic changes would hit the churches even harder than the to-
tal population. However, demographic changes would not be the main reason for 
the long-term development. Instead, church-specific factors, such as the number 
of baptisms, and members leaving and joining the church, and therefore, the long-
term declining number of children born to a Catholic or Protestant mother would be 
responsible for the decline in membership reported in this article.
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Appendix 
Tab. A1: Regional assignment of Catholic (arch-)dioceses, Protestant regional 
churches, and federal states
Catholic (Arch-)Dioecese Protestant regional church Federal state
North
Hamburg Braunschweig Bremen
Hildesheim Bremen Hamburg
Osnabrück Hannover Mecklenburg-Vorpommern
Offizialatsbezirk Oldenburg Nordkirche Niedersachsen
Oldenburg Schleswig-Holstein
Reformierte Kirche
Schaumburg-Lippe
East
Berlin Anhalt Berlin
Dresden-Meißen Berlin-Brandenburg- Brandenburg
Görlitz schlesische Oberlausitz Sachsen
Erfurt Mitteldeutschland Sachsen-Anhalt
Magdeburg Sachsen Thüringen
South
Bamberg Baden Baden-Württemberg
Eichstätt Bayern Bayern
Speyer Pfalz Saarland
Würzburg Württemberg Rheinland-Pfalz (50%)
Freiburg
Rottenburg-Stuttgart
München and Freising
Augsburg
Regensburg
Passau
West
Köln Hessen und Nassau Hessen
Aachen Kurhessen Waldeck Nordrhein-Westfalen
Essen Lippe Rheinland-Pfalz (50%)
Limburg Rheinland
Münster without Offizialatsbezirk Westfalen
Oldenburg
Trier
Mainz
Paderborn
Fulda
Source: Own representation
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